Binghamton University

The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
12-1991

Some Ways of Being in Plato
Allan Silverman
The Ohio State University, silverman.3@osu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy
Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Silverman, Allan, "Some Ways of Being in Plato" (1991). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Newsletter. 200.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/200

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator
of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.

DRAFT: SOIVÍE WAYS O F BEING IN PLATO, BY ALLAN SILVERMAN; SAGP, NYC/91
A proper assay o f Plato's ontology would treat o f all the different kinds o f things which, according
to Plato, are said to be. It would divide those kinds into the primitive and, if there are any, the derived, and
then show, where possible, how the latter kind o f beings arise from the former. In addition, it might try to
explain why Plato stkrts horn the primitives he does, that is, why he thinks them the best arxai. Finally,
perhaps, it would isolate and discuss any meta-principle which Plato relies on, and the very categories o f
the ontological theory, with the aim o f showing how they are to be assimilated to the theory itself. What
follows will not be a proper assay o f Plato’s ontology. I do not have the tim e to do a proper assay,
although the lack Oftime is only a prôphasis. Id o not know how to complete all diese tasks. So, in
deference to my fellow symposiast, I propose to examine on this occasion three closely related issues in the
interpretation o f Plato's metaphysics, die separation of Forms, participation, and the nature o f particulars1.
In the compass o f this talk, I cannot do justice to all three o f these issues, indeed probably to none o f them.
A fortiori, I cannot do a semblance o f justice to the closely related topics o f predication, both ontological
and linguistic; the status o f Aristotle's remarks about Plato's metaphysics and his own treatment o f these
issues, or the vexing problem o f the development o f Plato’s thinking. Nonetheless, I cannot avoid these
topics. So please regard the claims I stake about these matters as promissory. I hope to cash them later.
I: Remarks on the strategy.
The key to understanding Plato's metaphysics is to determine the various roles essence, ο υ σ ία ,
plays within i t I assume that Plato’s metaphysical inquiries begin with and from the Socratic 'W hat is X'
question. The answer to this question is a (linguistic) definition, λ ό γ ο ς , which has the form o f a subjectpredicate sentence consisting o f a subject-term, the definièndum, a copula, and a predicate-expression, die
definiens. (As a m atter o f convenience, however, I shall often use 'definition* to refer ju st to the definiens.)
The subject term is usually a name or noun phrase, e g .,' Justice' or 'T he Just Itself, while the predicateexpression is a complex phrase. The name signifies the object whose essence we are seeking. The predicate
signifies the essence of that Object. Thus when we know the answer to a W hat is X question, we know the
essence o f X. One question we must answer is what kinds o f things possess essences, or, equivalently,
can serve as the subject o f a definitioa G early Forms c a a It is not clear whether particulars such as
Socrates are definable. The worry here is not whether there are Forms o f natural kinds, as opposed to
Forms restricted in population to ineomplete properties. I shall posit Forms o f natural kinds. My concern,
rather, is whether particulars in natural kind classes are definable, or to put it differently, whether they have
essences. A second question concerning definitions is how the essence signified by the definiens applies to
the definable subjects. In the
we find a distinction between two ways a word or a predicate may
apply to an object It may apply in virtue o f what an object Has, or it may apply in virtue o f what an object
Is^. ' Beautiful' applies to Helen in virtue of the Beauty which she Has, not in virtue of what she Is. In
those cases where there are Form s,-and at the very least there are Forms for relatives and incomplete
notions like B eauty-, the text makes it clear that 'beautiful' applies to Beauty itself in virtue o f what it Is.
When it applies to other things, such as Helen, it does so in a secondary or derivative manner. Having
granted that there are Forms for predicates such as 'm an', the second question can be put as follows: does
the essence signified by a definiens apply to whatever it applies to in virtue o f what that thing Is, in virtue o f
what it Has, or in virtue o f either what it Is or what it Has. The final question is what are the metaphysical
consequences o f the fact that something does or does not have an essence, both with respect to the Forms
themselves, particulars, arid their relation to orie another.
How we answer thesé questions will partially determine what we make o f Plato’s account of
particulars, o f participation, and o f the separation o f Forms. If, for instance, we conclude that particulars
are not definable, we can claim that Forms are definitionally separate from particulars in that the definition
will apply only to the Form of, say, Man. If we add the thesis that possession o f essence is sufficient for
existence, we can then conclude that Forms are ontologically separate from particulars; being definable they
are capable on their own of existing apart from particulars (and perhaps from other Forms). On the other
hand, we may want to argue that although particulars cannot possess essences in the same manner as Forms
do, they must have essences lest they be bare particulars. Particulars will then have essences, w hereas
Forms are essences. Among other issues raised by this possibility is the nature o f the participation relation
itself. Traditionally, at least in one tradition, participation has been equated with the relation between a
particularand a Form, and opposed to the relation between a Form and its essence, which we can call
'B eing'. Are we then to conclude that a particular’s having an essence is due to its participation in a Form?
The status o f the participation relation and its interplay with essence leads directly to the third of our
questions. If particulars lack essences entirely, what are they and how do they come to be what they are?
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Conversely, since it seems clear that by the time o f th e Sophist Forms are not ju st o r not simply essences,
do Foim s participate in other Forms? Moreover, if Being itself is a Form, how are we to explain the notion
o f a Fbrm participating in Being?
In this talk I want to defend a view o f particulars according to which particulars are bundles o f
properties/Ihey are what they am by participating in Forms. They neither áre nor have essences, not even
relationally. The properties in these bundles are not the Forms themselves, but fonn-copies or propertyinstances. I will therefore offer a metaphysical account o f the nature o f these form-copies. I will also defend
a view o f participation according to which participation turns out to be a family concept, among whose sub
species is a primitive and sui generis relation that obtains between particulars and other entities, and between
Forms and other Forms. In both o f these cases I will argue that to participate in a Form is for the participant
to be characterized by that Form, i.eMto have the property(-instance)which the Form Is. Furthermore, I
want to show how Plato can claim that Forms and Forms alone participate id Being, where that a) commits
him to the previous claim that the participating Form is characterized in a certain way; but b) fails to commit
him to the claim that to participate in the Form Being is to treat existence ás a property, or c) to a vicious
regress o f Participations, and yet d) allows him to speak o f á special ontological relation. Being, that can be
contrasted with Participation. I will approach these positive claims from an examination o f the problem of
Separation. M y aim here is to clarify some o f the difficulties confronted by various interpretations o f what it
is for Forms to be separate, in order to develop some o f the tools I need to address the issues o f
participation and the nature o f particulars.
If we return to the Phaedo and its discussion o f how names or predicates apply to objects (102al0105c7), we note that the linguistic relations 'being the name o f and 'being the eponym o f appear to model
two metaphysical relations. Being and Participating, respectively. 'Beautiful1is the name o f Beauty because
Beauty Is beautiful, whereas it is the eponym o f Helen because she participates in the Form, Beauty. Helen,
we might say, is called derivatively by the predicate because she derives the property in virtue o f which the
predicate applies from the Form which is named by that predicate in a primary or non-derivative fashion.
The two metaphysical relations explain the linguistic predicability o f predicates to their subjects. In order to
approach the topics I wish to examine today, it is useful to state certain principles governing the relations of
Being and Participating. Let me adopt, at least provisionally, both the nomenclature and some o f the
fundamental principles o f the logic of Being and Having developed by H.P. Grice and Alan Code. O f
particular interest to me are what Code labels Formal Principles 3 and 4 and his total definitions:
FP3 If x Has y, then it is not the case that x Is y.
FP4 x Has y iff x Has something that Is y.
Taking the two notions Being and Having as primitive, Code goes on to define the following
ontological concepts:
D l X is predicable o f y iff either y Is X or y Has something which Is X.
D2 X is I-predicable o f y if and only if y Is X.
D3 X is H-predicable o f y iff y Has something that Is X.
D4 X = y iff X Is y and y Is X.
D5 X is individual iff (necessarily) for all y it is the case that (if y Is x, then x Is y)
D6 x is particular iff (necessarily) for all y it is the case that (if x is predicable of y, then (x Is y and y
. Isx ))
D7 x is universal iff (possibly) there is a y such that (x is predicable o f y and it is not the case that (x Is y
and y Isx))3.
I set out these principles and definitions neither out of loyalty nor any commitment to their
accuracy. Rather, I do so to exhibit the possibility that, first, we can employ à notion o f I- (or essential)
predication which does not amount to treating that notion as equivalent to identity; second, that within this
logic we can derive an identity relation from I-predication; and, finally, because this logic bans the
possibility that anything, x, can both Be and Have some property, y. Code, o f course, is well aware that
FP3 might be incompatible with doctrines expressed in thè Sophist He is equally aware that the logic as
stated may not capture Plato's theory at any stage o f its development, since it is designed to represent what
Aristotle may have thought to be the metaphysical theory of Plato especially as it appears in the Phaedo.
Code notes, for instance, that no provision is made for souls. Another omission are those mysterious
entities, the-large-in-Socrates, the-beautiful-in-Helen, what I've labelled 'form -copies^. In the subsequent
discussion, I w w rely on the logic o f Being and Hjaving-although with challenges to these definitions and
their im plications- both to explore the various answers to the three questions raised in our brief discussion
o f essence and to illustrate how those questions and their answers condition our conclusions about t ;
separation, participation and the nature of particulars.
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SEPARATION
O f the many features Plato allegedly ascribes to Fomis, none has had a more distinguished legacy
in the History o f Philosophy than separability, Piatonicum versals or Forms are allegedly separate or
transcendent, in contrast to the immanent universals or forms distinctive o f Aristotelian metaphysics.There
is no consensus today as to what Plato thought separation amounted ttA Indeed, it has been argued that
Plato never explicitly claims that Forms are separate, i.e. χωριστόν. If taken to the letter, this claim is
true. But Plato does assert that Forms are χ ω ρ ίς . More importantly, he frequently describes them in terms
that are arguably equivalent in sense to χωριστόν. Especially significant is his claim that forms are
αυτά καθ’ αυτά ο ντα. What then is meant by the claim that Forms are separable or are αυτά καθ’
αυτά beings? There are two aspects to the separation claim. There is the question o f the complement; from
what is a Form separate?; and there is the issue o f how it is separate. Since our concern is with the
separation o f Forms - a s opposed to particulars--, the first question divides in two:
la) (Some) Forms are separate from particulars; or (inclusive)
lb ) (Some) Forms are separate from other Forms.
The second question admits of three, possibly overlapping, answers:
2a) Forms are spatially separate; or
2b) Forms are ontologically separate,-w here this amounts to the claim that they can exist
independently of
: or
2c) Forms are definitionafiy or logically separate.
O f the six permutations, 2 al a) and 2alb) are relatively non-controversial. Forms are non-spatial in the sense
that they 'live' outside o f space (and time). We can say either that spatial separation is not applicable to
Forms, or that they are spatially separate from particulars which do occupy space. The spatial separation of
two (non-spatial) Forms is either moot or a m atter for stipulation.
The problems begin with combinations involving 2b). That forms are ontologically or existentially
separate from particulars, 2bla), is the traditional analysis o f what it is to be a Transcendent universal. The
weakest reading o f this claim would be to explicate ontological separation as amounting to nothing more
than difference from particulars. A stronger reading would be that a Form, F, can exist independently o f
anv given particular which is F. Since neither of these two readings would be repugnant to the proponent of
immanent universals, the favored interpretation o f 2bla) is that the Form can exist independently o f ah
particulars which are (have been or will be) F: Forms can exist uninstantiated^. This interpretation is not
free from difficulties. When we assert that Plato thinks that a Form can exist umnstantiated by particulars,
we heed to ask what notion o f particular is in play here. Some have alleged that H ato need not mean by
'particular* entities like Socrates or Fido, but rather only sensible properties. On this reading, in place o f
'particular* in la , we should write 'sensibles', thus allowing either sensible properties to be what Forms are
separate from, or sensible particulars. The primary motivation for this view is the presence o f a number of
arguments in the middle period-dialogues that, it is claimed, show that Forms, such as Beauty, cannot be
reduced to or identified with anv sensible property or properties.7 These arguments all concern the flux of
the sensible world and seem to turn on the compresence o f opposites. Given their reading o f this notion, it
is not the particulars themselves which suffer compresence, but sensible properly types such as 'being
brightfly) colored', o r 'being three feet long.' That a Form is not reducible to sensible properties does not
suffice to show that these Forms can exist independently o f sensible properties; for, as the proponents
admit, sensible properties may figure in die definition o f the Form, even if they do not exhaust it. If they do
occur in its definition, the Form will not be existentially independent o f sensibles.
Besides postulating sensible properties as a possibly relevant relatum, this approach to separation
seeks not so much to show drat Forms are existentially independent from particulars, but rather to exhibit
the reason (or a reason) why Plato thought Forms áre separate. To the extent that we are here relying on
Aristotle's account o f Plato's reasoning, it is not stiiprising that by A ristotle's lights the argument from flux
fails to justify separated Forms. Nor are the proponents o f separation as existential independence under any
illusions here. The argument(s) from flux recounted by Aristotle, they contend, gets Plato only the
conclusion that the universals required for knowledge and definition are non-sensible universals different
from sensibles. Additional premises are needed to get to separation, in particular premises to the effect that
these non-sensible universals are Forms, that diere are non-sensible substances, that the Forms are the nonsensible substances, and that rion-sénsible substances are separate. This last step is crucial. Aristotle argues
that since whatever is separate is a particular, the fact that Forms are separate entails that they are both
universal and particular. If I understand the argument advanced by these interpreters, while they concede
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that the flux argument guarantees that Fonns aie substances, as Plato understands that notion, it does not
guarantee that Forms exist separately from particulars. Aristotle o f course disagrees: in order to be a
substance the candidate must satisfy the separation criterion. And since the Flux argument does not show
that Forms are separate, it does not justify the claim that Forms are substances. Plato, on the other hand,
thinks that the flux o f sensibles, in conjunction with 'considerations about knowledge and definition,'
requires the existence o f Foims, i.e, non-sensible substances. That these substances do not satisfy
Aristotle's criteria, and hence do not license the conclusion that they áre separate substances, is true. Yet,
tiiis is not worrisome according to these integrators, because Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not make
separation a defining feature o f substances, ούσίαι. 'W henever he characterizes the realm of ousia, he
m entions-not separation but-changelessness, everlastingness, inaccessibility to sense perception, being
basic to knowledge and definition, and the like. As we have seen, none o f these features requires
separation.'(Fine,SEP, 70-71)
Let us leave to one side the reconstruction o f Aristotle's arguments here. Instead, let us ask two
questions, one about Plato's use o f the flux argum ent, the second about the notion o f existential
independence itself. How are we to understand the sense o f 'existential' in the phrase 'existential
independence*? Perhaps it is thought to be obvious that Forms, for Pialo, exist, that the only question is
whether their existence requires the sometime presence o f a particular which instantiates them**. I believe
th a t th e 'problem atic* o f existence, as it h as developed o ver th e cen tu ries, h as a t tim es
o b scu red th e issues involved in th e debate oyer se p aratio n in P lato . T h a t existence is
som e p rim itiv e a n d inexplicable p ro p erty o f F orm s is n o t I th in k P la to 's view o f th e
m atter" In fact, the argument from flux suggests why this is not so. The critical steps in the flux argument
take Plato from the flux o f sensibles to their unknowability and/or indefinability. Since it is assumed that
there is knowledge and definition, and that these require universal«, this allows us to conclude that there are
universale distinct from sensible particulars. As Fine constructs the rest o f Aristotle's argument, we then
assume that these non-sensible universale are Forms, that there are non-sensible substances, and that the
only candidates for these non-sensible substances are the Forms. But this is to leave the notion o f substance
, ούσίαι, hanging in thin air. A more plausible account is to link the notions o f knowability and
definability to substance-hood. Nor is this link hard to forge. For Plato, as sometimes for Aristotle,
knowledge is knowledge Of definitions, and what definitions are, or, rather, what linguistic definitions
signify, are essences, ούσίαι. Thus if, with Plato, we assume that there is knowledge, and that
knowledge has an object, we can conclude that there are essences. From here, we can derive the conclusion
that there are non-sensible substances from the assumption that whatever an essence is 'present to' is, for
Plato, always a substance and the assumption that sensibles are notknow able or definable, that is sensibles
lack essences. If Forms possess essences, and hence are substances, can we then argue that they are
separate, that they exist independently o f particulars? The answer seems to m e to be yes. The argument will
have two stages. In the first stage wé will contend that in virtue o f possessing an essence the Form exists.
N ot only does this comport with the Greek, it gives some flesh to the otherwise bare notion o f existence that
is under scrutiny in the separation debate. Iti support o f this claim, we can cite the intuition that in order to
exist o r be, the subject m ust be something. D early, being ari essence counts as being something. Indeed,
tiie Platonist might urge that this dictum is too weak. In its place he might insist that for something to exist
is for it to possess an essence. T h at x is F is necessary an d sufficient fo r x to be. T h at is to
say th e re is no d iffere n t o r special notion o f existence: being som ething o r, b e tte r, Being
some essence, is all th e re is to the notion. The secpnd stage should then show that these ούσίαι,
the Forms, exist independently o f particulars. Having granted that Forms have essences and hence exist, all’
that remains is to show that their possession o f an essence is not dependent upon thé existence o f the
sensible particulars. This, however, seems to fall out o f the argument from flux. Once it is granted that
sensibles are in flux and that anything in flux is indefinable, we can conclude that the sensibles do not
possess essences. For if they did, they would not be indefináble. So, that the Form possesses an essence is
not dependent upon the sensible's possession o f an Essence. Perhaps it m ight be claimed that Forms can
possess an essence only if particulars do instantiate» i.e., participate in, Forms. But what could be thé
motivation for such a Claim? The mere participation in the Form contributes nothing to the Form’s
possession or failure to possess an essence; for participation, it appears, is not only independent from
Being in the Phaedo, it seems to exclude Being: what participates fails to be (in respect o f that in which it
particulars, because they show that Forms possess essences, that sensible particulars do .not possess
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essences, and becáuse Plato assumes that the possession o f essence entails the existence o f that which
possesses the essence.
,
If possession o f an essence is sufficient for existence, on a Platonic reading o f existence, then
position 2blb), does a Form F exist independently o f all other Forms, amounts to the question 'C an a Form
exist by itself, that is, if no other Forms exist? The answer seems to me to be no. Such a Form would be
victim to the arguments leveled against the One o f the first Hypothesis o f the Parmenides. A second
question would be whether a given Form can exist if certain other Forms do not ex ist It is hard to know
what to say here. If we consider the megista gene to he necessary properties o f all Forms, for instance, then
it seems reasonable to assert that were they not to ex ist no Form would exist. On the other hand, it does
seem possible for some Forms, or better, families o f Forms, to exist apart from other Forms or families o f
Forms. Is it not possible that there be Forms o f Colors, say, but no Forms o f M oral Properties? At bottom,
I suspect that the evaluation o f this position depends upon the stance we take to Plato’s teleology and, more
germanely, the stance we take to the relation o f the so-called elements o f the definition o f some Form to the
Form being defined; for example, could the Form, Man, itself, exist apart from the Form Animal Itself?
Guidance as to how to draw the lines which mark off families o f Forms from one another is needed, if we
are to maintain that the existence o f certain Forms is independent o f the existence o f certain other Forms.
W hatever can be said in the compass of this talk about the independence o f Forms from one another is best
left until we have discussed definitional separation, to which I now turn.
By 'definitional separation’ scholars seem to mean one o f two things. On one reading o f the notion,
A is definitionally separate from B if the the definition o f A does not apply to Β 1^ On the other reading, A
is definitionally separate from B only if A is definable without mention of (the definition of) B *1. On the
former reading, we provisionally restrict the type o f definable entities to the Form and the type o f entities
from which the Form is definitionally separate to particulars. Accordingly, Forms are definitionally separate
from particulars in that the definition of the Form does not (cannot) apply to any particulars.The motivation
behind this reading is a solid one: Forms just are their essences, or at least the essence is 1-predicable
(essentially predicable) o f the Form. Particulars, on the other hand, are whatever they are via Participation.
Whereas Beauty Is F, Helen Has F. Nonetheless, this reading is not without difficulties. Some m ight wish
to contend that Platonic particulars within the natural kind categories do have essential properties, where the
'having o f essential properties (essences)' by these particulars is understood not to differ in manner from
'th e having of essential properties (essences)’ on the part o f Forms. I do not believe that particulars hâve
essences in this manner. Let us assume therefore that particulars never Are anything, that whatever they are,
they are in virtue o f Having. M y problem is that the Form, which we concede the particular Has, and its
essence turn out to be identical. This is true regardless o f whether we adopt the Identity approach associated
with Chemiss and Allen, Or with the Code-Grice Logic o f Izzing and Hazzing. But if the Form and its
essence are identical, how can the Form be predicable o f a particular and the essence fail to be predicable?
We can try additional restrictions; for example, we might stipulate that a Form F is definitionally separate
from a (all) particular F just in case the essence o f F is I-predicable o f The F alone. This would allow
particular Fs to Have the essence without offending the purport o f this reading o f the separation o f the Form
from the particulars1^. The trouble is, we need to make sense o f the notion that an essence can be
predicated o f something, o r in the linguistic mode, that a linguistic definition can be a linguistic-predicate of
some subject-predicate sentence, and yet not be essentially predicated o f that thing. This is not the same
problem as denying that some particular is identical with its essence. Rather, it is the problem of
distinguishing among all the properties which are possessed in the same w ay-nam ely, via participation-,
the one that is the particular's essence from the rest, which are its (merely) accidental properties.
Since our concern is with what a particular Has, it is not implausible to fry as a possible solution to
this problem an appeal to form-copies. If we add form-copies to our considerations, we stipulate that
particulars do not Have Forms, but rather form-copies. This frees us from the bind resulting from the
identification o f the Form with its essence. But we now require an account of the relation between the Form
and a form-copy. Since we are using the Logic o flzzing and Hazzing, we are forced to say that the formcopy Is F, since Having is defined as a particular's Having something which Is F, That 'som ething’ is the
form-copy. That a property-instance is the same in essence as the property o f which it is an instance is
certainly not unintuitive1A Besides, were the form-copy also a Haver o f the Form , we would be o ff on a ,
regress or we would have to confront again the problem o f how something can Have an essence. If,
therefore, à form-copy Is its essence, then the definition o f the Form will be I-predicable o f i t Hence, a
Form F will not be definitionally separate from its form-copies. On the other hand, unless the Form is /?;■·;.
identical with its form-copies, we can still claim the definitional separability o f Forms from particulars. For
particulars will Have form-copies, and form-copies will not be identical with their essences. Here the utility
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o f letting identity be a function o f reciprocal I-predicaüon comes to the fore. The Form and its essence are
identical, on the Logic o f Izzing and Hazzing, because the essence, Y, is I-predicable o f thé Form, X, and
the Fonn, X, is I-predicable o f the essence, Y. If the fonn-cojpes are not to be identical with the Forni,-and at least they should not be numerically identical, since property-instances are not identical with the
property o f which they are instances--, then we must block die reciprocal I-predicability o f foim-copy and
essence. Since we have claimed thät the essence (Of the Fonn) is I-predicable o f the form-copy, we must
hold that the form-copy is not I-predicable o f the essence. That form-copies are hot identical with the Form
is I think implied by Plato's depiction o f them in the Phaedo and the Timaeus. They, it will be remembered,
withdraw and perish and enter and exit the receptacle whereas the Form performs none o f these military
maneuvers. On the other hand, unlike the particulars, which are named after the Fonns, the form-copies
are, like the Forms themselves, named by the expressions which also name the Fonns; that is, a linguistic
predicate or ονομα applies to the Form and the foim-copy in the same manner (103b,e).This suggests that
die essence is predicable o f both. And finally, there is the cléàr hint in the dialogue that form-copies are not
only numerically distinct from the Form, they are also numerically distinct from one another. For thebeautiful-in Helen and the-beautifiil-in-Andromache are in fact different
There is more to be said about form-copies and their relation to particulars, but once again let me
postpone that discussioa I want to turn briefly to the other reading o f definitional separation, and to the
attendant question o f whether the Forms are definirioriaily separate from one another. Those who offer the
second account o f definitional separation, that A can be defined without mention o f B, are prone to
distinguish sensible particulars from sensible properties, (see above p. ) W hile this may seem to render the
question o f separation from particulars moot, it is not without textual or philosophical merit. It would be a
special, and I think clearly tmPlatohic, property whose definition mentioned a particular, though such
properties are possible (e.g., the property o f orbiting the sun). But if by 'definitional separation' it is meant
that the definiens does not mention a sensible property, we are owed, first, an account o f what makes one
property 'sensible' or ' observational',-thatis an account o f what Plato might have made o f these notionsand, second, an explanation o f why Plato would find sensible properties repugnant The colors are
definable, as the Timaeus at least suggests, as what is able to compact or dilate the visual stream in a
particular way. It would seem therefore, that we cannot ban all sensible properties from the world o f
Forms. But why then is Red(ness) not definitionaJly separate from sensibles?
Since I am not sure how the proponents o f this reading would answer these two questions, let us
see what is involved in general in explaining the separation of a Form from another Form ju st in case no
mention is made o f the other Form in the former's definition. The idea is that if something, the Form G, is
mentioned in the definition o f F, then F is not separable from G. Difficulties arise when we press the issue
o f whether F is separate from those properties mentioned in the definition o f G, and the properties
mentioned in the definitions o f the other elements o f the definition o f F, say H and I. At the lim it, we arrive
at Speusippean wholism, the doctrine that no Form is definitionally separable from any other. We can o f
course try to lim it the exposure o f one Form to another through appeal to families o f Forms, perhaps along
the lines suggested by tiie hierarchies developed through the method o f collection and division. On the other
hand, we might stick to the intuition that definitional separation amounts to the nothing more than the
definitional distinctness o f each Form. Since each Form has a unique definition, each is different from every
other Form. Here we retreat to the former reading o f definitional separation. For on this reading, the reason
that each Form is separable is just that the definition is predicable o f nothing other than itself (and its formcopies). Hence, the definition o f a giveh Foim, F, is not predicable o f any other Form. I suspect that the
only way we can approach the topic of definitional separation o f one Form from the others, and with it the
related question o f whether Forms can exist independently from some others, is to examine whether, and in
what sense. Forms participate or have a share o f each o th e rH To that topic I now tiim.
PARTIQPATION
Ryle's Regress is an objection leveled against Plato's theory o f universels. In brief, the idea is that
according to Plato participation is a relation between one thing, the particular, and a second thing, the Form.
Since this relation is found in all cases of particulars possessing properties, we have, by Plato's lights* a
many - a ll the instances o f participation-over which we should posit a onfe, the Fonn Participation itself.
Let me quote Ryle: ' We have two different instances o f the relation o f being-an-instance-of. What is the
relation between them and that o f which they are instances? It will have to be exemplification Number 2.
The exemplification o f P by S will be an instance of exemplification, and its being in that relation to
exemplification will be ah instance of a second-order exemplification, and that o f a third, and so on ad
infinitum. 15* One response to this regress is to insist that inherence or exemplification or Participation is

DRAFT: SOME WAYS OF BEING IN PLATO, BY ALLAN SILVERMAN; S AGP, NYC/91
not a relation, but rather is a sui generis relationship or, to put it somewhat differently, a non-relational
tie. *6 The deliberate vagueness o f Plato's remarks about what Participation is perm it one to infer that he too
drought that the notion was sui generis. That it is sui generis does n o t, however, vitiate the force o f Ryle’s
objection. Were the many instances over which we are positing a single Form not o f their own special kind,
there would be no need for a distinctive Form. The emphasis m ust be put first on the fact that we are talking
about a special relationship, inhering, instancing, or exemplifying, not on the sui generis character o f the
multiple cases o f the relationship. We must beprepared to deny that we are here talking about instances of â
relation, as that notion is traditionally understood. I think that there are three arguments available to Plato to
justify such a denial. The first is quite general. Plato could appeal to theoretical considerations. Each theory
has to start from some primitives, where what is primitive is revealed in the structure o f the theory itself.
So, it is open to Plato to say, as he does, that Participation is I know not what, but let it be whatever
connects participants or subjects to their properties. Because it is both primitive or indefinable, and because
it is not the kind o f relation, e.g., larger than, over whose many instances the theory typically does posit a
Form, there is no regress to worry about.
The other two arguments are more peculiar to Plato. One focuses on the nature o f the supposed
relation. Dyadic relations Obtain between two relata or objects*?, in the case o f Participation between a
particular and a Form, Plato clearly has to concede that the Form is an objects M ust he concede that the
particular is an object? It seems to me that he does n o t Participation between a particular and a form does
not so much 'add' a property to an independently existing object, an object that would o r could exist prior to
any Participation it migjht engage in. Rather, Participation is what gives thé particular any and all o f its
properties; it somehow constitutes the particular and so Participation cannot be a relation holding between
an object and a Form. Here it m i^it be objected that Plato, at least, is still subject to the regress. For after
all, even if Participation is best seen not as a relation but rather as something like 'being present at' or
compresence, we have many instances o f compresence and hence the need for a one over this many. Maybe
so. But if so, I do not see that a vicious regress threatens.
The second argument in defence o f Plato begins (and ends) from the Sophist. O f all the dialogues
the Sophist offers the most deliberate and detailed discussion o f the communion o f Forms. Along with the
Parmenidest it is one o f the few places in which Plato analyses the sorts o f properties or Forms which
might be called foundational to the theory. By this I mean tiro sort o f properties which belong to all (o r
almost all) Forms simply in virtue of the fact that they are Forms. Let us call these Formal properties. These
include at least some o f tiro megista gene. For the moment, let me postpone the question o f whether the
communion relation,-that is, the partaking of Forms in one another-, is the same as the Participation
relation obtaining between particulars and Forms. I want to focus first on the fact that Participation, or
Partaking, or Communion, is not here said to be a Form, and the fact that among the megista gene wé do
find Being. These two facts seem to me to reinforce the suspicion that Plato did not think, or want to have
to maintain, that Participation is a Form such that Ryle's regress could victimize the theory. It is necessary
to take the two together in order to derive this support. For the mere absence o f Participation is telling only
if we think that the megista gene exhaust the greatest kinds or most important Forms. But there is reason not
to believe this. We recall the Republic, where the Good is cited as the most important and somehow the
foundation o f all Forms; in the Parmenides
have Unity, a Form that seems to be partaken o f by all
Forms, itself included; and in the Symposium we find reason to think that Beauty is a Form that all Forms
partake of, or should partake of, because all Forms are, for Plato, beautiful. So it might be argued that
Participation, like these others, was just left Off the lis t However, the force o f this counter seems to me to
be diminished by the fact that Being is on the list. Being* after all is said and done, seems to be a Form that
represents the ontological relation that obtains between a Form and what the Form is, namely its essence.
Since the Phaedo at least, Being has been found in opposition to Participating: the former is the way or
mode o f being enjoyed by Forms; the latter is the way enjoyed by particulars. Even if we concede that in the
(early) middle period, Forms do not participate, that Being excludes participating, and that in the later period
Being no longer excludes participating, the fact remains that Being is a or the distinctive mode o f being for
Forms. But if both Being and Participating are ways o f being, what reasons m ight Plato have for insisting
in the Sophist that there is a Form Being, which would, at the same time, prompt him to refrain from
positing a Form Participating?
One possibility is that Participating is subsumed under Being. When Plato distinguishes thé two
kinds o f beings, or two ways in which beings are said (255c 12-13), perhaps the auta kathautasense
correlates with Being and the pros alio sense correlates with Participating. We need o f course an analysis of
these two ways o f being or being said. With that in hand we can ask whether there is some common bond
between them. If there is some common or overarching connection, then we shall cite that as part o f our
rational reconstruction o f why there is a single Form Being. If there is not some common connection, - if ,
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that ist the two different ways o f being are assimilated only because o f some common way o f speaking^--,
then we are back at square one.
One prominent an alysis^ holds that 'is ' is used in the first way in a sentence o f the form 'X is
Y \ if What is signified by 'X* is not different from Y-riess. It is used in the second way if they do
differ.W hen unpacked» however, we find that the first way represents the 'is ' o f definition, namely where
Y-ness stands for the essence o f X. Here then we have a use that that relies on the special relationship
between a thing and its essence ( and perhaps also parts o f its essence). The second way o f being said to be,
within the notion o f Being* a characterizing and a definitional 'is'. However, if we allow that Plato thinks
some Forms are characterized by themselves, then even if we have these two uses, this analysis in terms of
distinct relata or same relata will not do. For example. Difference is what it is to be different-this is the first
use. But in so far as it is different from all olher Forms, it also is characterized by itself. This is, it seems,
a different sense o f 'is ' from the first, and yet it is not the pros a lb o r second use specified above. On this
analysis, then, all self-characterizing statements would be classified as auta hath auta statements, even
though they differ in sense from the 'is ’ o f definition.
A second analysis focuses on the relation represented by 'is ', as opposed to the relata. It insists that
there is only one kind of'isV what I have called the characterizing 'is'. The difference isolated at 255 is then
explicated in term s o f self-predication versus 'other-predication', i.e., partaking o f some Form other than
itself. In this case, Being ju st is Participating. Now this works if we are willing to view self-predication as
it was introduced by Vlastos2^ All forms onthis account do not self-predicate, so there w ill be some
Forms which will be characterized by the properties that characterize all Forms, and some which, in
addition, will be self-characterized. One problem w ith this approach is that it seems not to square with the
text. What one would expect to find is the opposition 'som e beings are said auta hath a u tà -te c m st they
self-participate- but âfi forms are said pros a lb .^
Finally, we come to the view that Being in the Sophist is the property Existence: the auta hath auta
way of being sáid represents existence statements, i.e. the 'is ' is complete or 1-place; the pros a lb stands
for predications where the 'is* is incomplete or 2-place. Here we find a reason not to posit Participating as a
Form, whereas we do have a reason for positing Being as a Form* namely the fact that Existence ils a
property. Here, participation is a relation obtaining between Forms, including the Form Being. Motion, for
example, partakes o f or participates in Being and thus exists. (256al) This leaves open the possibility that
Being can be said to be auta hath auta, i.e. to participate in Being, and thereby exist, and to be said pros
a lb , where by pros a lb predication we mean to indicate that it participates in other Forms. Notice that this is
a special case o f self-participation. There may be other Forms that self-participate. On the o tter hand, it
seems clear that all Forms (and perhaps everything else) participates in Being, where Being is existence, for
all o f them are. Notice also that as an on, Being will not serve as a predicate in a pros a//# predication.
Giyen its nature as a Form, Being when partaken of, will always be the predicate o f m auta kath auta
statement
I do not wish to enter into the debate over whether in the Sophist Plato isolates, or uses, or should
be understood sometimes to be using, the 'is ' o f existence. If Being is Existence, arid if being Said to be
auta kath auta is meant to be an existence claim, then we still confiront two questions. One is the problem of
the essence. It seems to drop out o f the picture on this view, for it neither goes smoothly into pros a lb
predications nor does it seem to emerge in the analysis of Existence and partaking o f Existence. It is not, in
general, required that any subject that partakes of Existence thereby becomes or acquires an essence;
particulars may lack essences and yet still exist Perhaps we could posit that when a Form partakes o f Being
it comes to have/be an essence. But this is just an additional stipulation. The second problem is similar: we
seem to have left out any way to describe what I have been calling self-participation statements. When we
say that One is, we speak o f a being auta kath auta, If we insist that pros a lb predication always introduces
a second Form, then we find that self-participation is impossible. This last defect can I think be remedied. If
pros alio predication is neutrally viewed as either participation simpliciter or, perhaps more plausibly, as all
other kinds o f predication than auta kath auta, then We can plug self-participation in as one lord o f pros alio
predicatioa
It seems to me that a contrastive reading of pros ¿rife predication offers the best hope o f
understanding the difference between the two ways o f being said to be and the postulation o f the Form
Being. D ie contrastive reading o f pros a lb uses of 'is ' will segregate being said to be auta kath auta from all
other forms o f predication. These o tter forms will embrace both complete and incomplete predicates and,
more importantly I think, predication statements whose subject and predicate expression refer to the same
property or thing, but are not auta kath auta (hereafter 'aka') statements. An aka predication will use what
might m ost safely be called ' the definitional "is" ’. Typically ip the dialogues síieh stateÉ en^ hávé tiie form
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F(ness) is F. These are definitional in the sense that the predicate awaits the proper unpacking, which
should culminate in the hilly articulated definition upon the discovery or determination o f the essence o f the
Form being defined. If to possess an essence, in the case o f a Form, is for it to be or exist, then the world
o f Forms is the world o f definable entities and exists simply in virtue o f the fact that Forms are definable22.
These definitional stateents are to be distinguished from ordinary identity statements which, for
Plato, will involve the subject's relation to the Form Sameness. In virtue o f partaking o f Sameness each
Form is self-identical. On the other hand, there is a Form, F, that can partake o f Sameness and thus be selfidentical, ju st because F, in a 'conceptually prior* partaking2^ partakes o f Being and thereby acquires or
possess an essence. Naturally, Sameness, Difference and Being present special difficulties here. Consider
Difference. Difference is a Form and hence Difference has an essence. When we wish to state this fact we
would have to use 'b e ' in an aka fashion, i.e., 'D ifferent is (Is) different'. If this is correct, we find
ourselves up against Plato's declaration at d l that Difference is always said [ to be?] pros eteron, with
respect to something else or with respect to something different. Now we cannot escape the bind merely by
distinguishing 'D ifference' used as subject and 'is different’ used as predicate. For in our aka stàtement we
can legitimately have 'is different' as predicate. By 'D ifferent is different' we learn that The Different has a
nature, that it Is that nature. In the injunction at d l-7 we are told that when 'difference' is predicated then the
subject is being said to be different from something or everything else. When 'is different* is used in the aka
statement, let us say that it is not being different that is predicated, but what it is to be different for in effect
we are saying that the essence is being predicated o f The Form Difference. Thus, as with all other Forms,
Difference is (Is) what it is, difference, in virtite o f its own nature. In the case o f everything else, however,
there is little confusion when we point out that sáv. Justice, simply in virtue o f its own nature is not
different from all other Forms. Rather Justice is different from all other Forms because o f its participation
in the D ifferent We must be careful not to think that what Justice is in virtue of its own nature contributes
nothing to the grounding o f its difference from all other Forms. In the case o f every Form, each is different
fronrevery other because o f its own nature, namely because it is a natured entity and hence Is, and because
for Plato there is the meta-principle that each Form has one nature and each nature is the nature o f exactly
one Form. Recognition o f this contribution allows us to say that ju st because something is a Form, it
partakes o f Difference. Hence, simply because it is a Form, Difference not only is (Is) what it is to be
different, but it is different, where here we are using 'is different' in the pros eteron or pros alio sense.
When we say that the Different is different from everything else, we assert that the Different partakes o f
itself. Nehamas, who has written trenchantly on this passage2^, runs into some difficulties here; He says
that the statement, 'th e Different is different from everything else’, is not grounded in the nature o f
Difference, but 'ÇRJather, it is grounded in the fact that the Different, like everything else, partakes o f the
different and is distinguished from other things in virtue o f possessing characteristics which it does not
share with them.’ (357) W ith the first conjunct I have no quarrel. W ith the second I do. W hile possessing
the chairacteristic o f going through all the Forms will distinguish Difference from most Forms, what
characteristic distinguishes Difference from the other megista gene or at least Sameness and Being? Pace
Nehamas' claim that the difference of Difference is not grounded in its own nature, I can think o f nothing
that distinguishes Difference from everything else except its possession o f its own nature (or properties
which are grounded in its nature).
Nehamas goes on to argue that we can understand statements o f the form 'T he Beautiful itself is
other than beautiful* or 'The beautiful itself is not beautiful’ as asserting not that 'th e nature o f Beauty is not
what it is, but only that Beauty possesses some other characteristic as well.’ (363) This is established
through a consideration of the role Sameness and Difference can play as second-order properties. We can
say o f a ball and a shirt that they are the same in virtue or respect o f their sharing a property, say both o f
them are red. Sameness can range over all properties and be predicated on the basis o f two things sharing
some property. Similarly, Difference ranges over all properties and can be predicated on the basis o f two
titings failing ro share a property, fo the case o f Beauty, because being beautiful (or even partaking o f
beauty?) is a different property from, say, being the same as itself, we can say that Beauty is not beautiful
and mean that it is something elser namely thé sanie (as itself). Nehamas generalizes this treatment and
concludes that we can say that Difference is different from Difference and grounds this in the fact that it is
something other than different, namely, say, it is tiie same as itself. I agree. However, when he connects
this treatment o f the peculiar 'is not’ statements, e.g., Beautiful is not beautiful’, with the grounding o f the
statement that the Different is different from everything else, he seems to be suggesting that the Different
partakes o f Difference because o f some other character that it possesses. It seems that Nehamas believes that
were it not the case that there were some other characteristic it possessed, the Different could not partake of
^ Difference. This is wrong, I behéve. T ^ p iffe re n t, like every Form, partikes o f Difference simply because
it is à Form. It is true that there will be other characteristics which Difference possesses; the megista gene
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guarantee th at each F o n n is w hat it is and, in addition, is w hatever th e m egista gene stand for. A nd this
sam e fact renders it inconceivable th at the D ifferent o r any F onn could fail to have these properties. B ut it is
n o t th e possession o f d iese properties w hich licenses o r grounds th e D ifferent's partaking o f itself. T hese
kinds o f facts are all dependent upon the nature o f die D ifferen t B ecause it has a nature, i.e. because it is a
Form , the D ifferent h as these characteristics and, m oreover, it is ow ing to the very nature o f the D ifferent
th at these are distinct characteristics. B y the sam e token, there w ill be no characteristic th at the D ifferent
possesses apart from possessing its nature th at distinguishes it from the m egista gene w h ic h lack that
characteristic. So, it is because it is other things besides w hat it is to be different that the D ifferent cari be
said to b e different from th e D ifferen t B ut it is because it is w hat it is, it is because o f its nature, th at it is
these o ther things. A nd w hen w e w ish to explain why the D ifferent self-participates,--in N eham as' term s to
ground th e statem ent th at it is different from everything e ls e - , w e can n o t appeal to features that it has o r
lacks w hich distinguish it from everything, n o r need w e cite th e other features, e.g., Sam eness, th at it has
because it is a Form . It self-partakes because it is a Form , because every Form partakes o f the D ifferen t
N ow the sam é pattem o f argum entation, m utatis m utandis, would show w hy the Sam e is the sam e
and w hy it partakes o f die Sam e, and w hy die One is one and partakes o f the One. I forego these
dem onstrations in order to return to Being. W e began this section puzzling over w hy there is a Form Being
b u t no form Participation Itself. W e have found th at it is necessary in order to understand P lato's various
rem arks in th is section o f th e Sophist to appeal repeatedly to die Form 's nature Or essence. W e appealed to
essence w hen we explained w hat it is fo r a being to be said to be in the m ía ka th auta fashion, and the
possession o f an essence was critical in the account o f a Form 's possession o f o ther properties, especially
Sam eness and D ifference. The notion o f being an essence is thus at least on a p ar w ith the notion o f being
different from everything else and being the same as itself. Indeed, it is prior in that in order to be the sam e
as itself, each Form m ust be w hat it is, and this is ju st w hat it is fo r a Form to be. Plato, I subm it, conceives
o f B eing as this generic property, i.e„ essencing. Each Form , w hen it partakes o f Being, is essenced arid,
once essenced, can be said to be, -fu ll stop if you lik e -, can be said to be different horn everything e ls e w hich in the case o f Form s m eans every other essenced th in g -, arid Can be said to be the sam e as itself. The
distinctions in tim e. R ather they are confined to mom ents in the conceptual o r logical dim ension There is no
tim e w hen D ifference is w hat it is to be different yet not different from all other Form s, as though it were
w aiting for diem to partake o f Being. Y et it is talk o f Being partaking in Being o r D ifference Partaking o f
Being that is so difficult to wrap one's m ind around. One source o f die difficulty is that there is no subject,
i.e, no Form , prior to the Form 's partaking o f Being. A second, perhaps related, and m ore profound
difficulty is that we are w ont in some way to regard Being as a Form On a par w ith Red w hen we consider
how it is partaken of. Everything that is red partakes o f Redness, and in partaking o f Redness com es to be
die same thing, nam ely red, W e can say that everything that is partakes o f Being, and then say that in
partaking o f Being everything cOrries to be the same düng, nam ely existing. B ut this I think is not quite
right, though I do not deny these claims. I would change die end o f the second conjunct to read 'th e same
thing, nam ely ag ein g '. For this better signals that what each becomes in partaking is its own unique nature
o r essence. W hat is common among all the Forms is that each is a thing o f this kind, an essenced thing, not
that each possesses the sam e property, existence, o r the same essence.
If this is coherent, then Plato has reason to postulate a Form Being. It also goes some way towards
explaining why there is no Form Participation Itself. For the relation o f partaking is common to all
interactions among Forms and participants. The form Difference partakes o f Being and partakes o f
Sameness. W hen it does so, it is tied to its object in different ways, not because o f the relation but because
o f the nature o f the relatum, Being. W hen it partakes o f Being, it becomes essenced. I think that the special
function o f this Form to create or legitim ize subjects for the partaking relation licenses Plato's postulation o f
a special way o f being, what Plato describes as being said to be aka, partaking o f Being, o r what I have
called Ising. We can say that the Form becomes characterized by Being, where it is understood á) that it was
not a legitim ate object before this partaking, and (b) provided that we understand that being characterized by
Being does not entail that there is some single first-bnder property everything becomes in being so
characterized. We can then say that iri partaking o f Sameness and Difference, each o f these Forms does
become characterized by these properties. Indeed ail Forms are so characterized because they are Forms.
(SO, too, I think that ju st because they are Forms, all Forms partake o f and hence are characterized by
Beauty, Good, M otion and Rest. Hence all these Forms also self-predicate and self-participate.) There is a
sense, however, in which Being is special in respect o f self-participation. W ith the other self-participating
Forms, they each acquire their respective natures in virtue o f their participation in Being, and then go on to
acquire the characteristic property that they constitute because o f their nature. Being, too, acquires its nature
by partaking in Being, whatever tfmt
..mlght-be. But it is hard to envisage what fim her participation in
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Being could be appropriately described as self-participating. Here perhaps we can say is that there is no
difference with respect to Being between self-partaking and self-predicating. Or a lte rn a te ly ^ , we can
appeal to the fact that in partaking o f other Forms, each o f which is itself a being, Being self-participates.
I have argued that participation, at least among Forms, is a primitive notion wherein the subject is
characterized by the property named by the predicate. The special exception is participation in Being, which,
because o f its foundational role, has a special cachet and merits a special way o f being said. If we are
satisfied that Being is a Form while partaking is not, then we can maintain our theory that there are two
basic predication relations in Plato only with some adjustments. One obvious adjustment is to assert that
while there are two predication relations in the middle period, there is only one in the later, namely
partaking. On behalf o f this assertion we might point to the elevation o f Being to the status o f a Form and
Plato's recognition, apparently around the time o f the Parmenides, that Forms also participate. However, if
we consider that when Being is partaken of, that partaking creates or endows entities with essences, we
can preserve everything we want from the Ising relation (provided that Forms alone partake o f Being). To
participate in Being is to become an entity o f a special sort and once one is such an entity, then one can enter
into further relations with other entities of the same kind. These partaking relations will again characterize
the Form. If this is a co rrea way to view the matter, then we should go on to discuss three issues left oyer
from our discussion o f predication and participation: 1) what is the relation between the Form and the
elements o f the definition; 2) what is the status o f second-order properties like Being a Form, or being able
to possess properties; and 3) what analysis can we give o f particulars o f the ordinary sort.
Let us begin with the fitst question. The problem is this: We seem to have a choice between the
Scylla of Hazzing, in which casé the Horse itself partakes of, perhaps necessarily, Animality, and thus is an
animal; or the Charybdis ö f Ising, in which case The Horse Itself Is animal, and thus seems to possess two
essences, that o f Horse and that o f A nim al^. We can beat various retreats here. To avoid Scylla some
might protest that Forms are not like particulars when it comes to Having or partaking. They are abstract
objects and abstract objects, unlike particulars are not characterized when they partake. To think that they do
is to commit a 'level' confusion. This will not do as it stands, since Forms â££ characterized by certain
properties, e.g. the megista gene. Indeed, there are other properties true o f Forms, for instance, etemality,
non-spatiality, immutability, not to mention some relational properties such as being capable o f being
known or named. W hether there are Forms corresponding to all these properties is our second question. Yet
we can now say that these are the sorts of properties that Plato finds appropriate for Forms and
inappropriate for ordinary particulars. Nonetheless, were they predicated o f particulars one would not assert
something nonsensical, ju st something false. We therefore have little reason to think that in partaking Forms
do not become characterized simply because they are Forms or abstraa objects. They are characterized by
the properties that are appropriate to them (and necessarily so).
A second tack is to insist that the relation o f predication obtaining between a particular and a Form
is a different relation from that which obtains between a Form and another Form. The genera-species
hierarchies o f collection and division exhibit Plato's penchant for classifying Forms as related to one
another in some way, but he nowhere considers Forms to be characterized by the predicates which appear
above them in the hierarchies. So merely two predication relations will not do for the later Plato, if we some
kind o f predication relation holds between the genera, species and differentiae o f a classificatory scheme.
Now I think this is true as far as it goes, but I am not sure where it does go. The fact remains that some of
the relations between Forms concern properties that Forms do have, i.e. are charaaerized by, to w it the
above mentioned megista gene and the properties peculiar to Forms. As for the relations between the
'nodes' o f the classificatory schema, I believe that the they amount to nothing more than relation o f the
elements o f the definition to the Form defined. If they do not, then we can say that this tack amounts to
insisting that there is some third relation special to this problem, some third relation which in general is not
specified in the dialogues.
Perhaps we are mislead in asking how the elements o f the definition are related to the definiendum
by the syntactic complexity o f the lingmstic definition. Certainly Aristotle and, I think, Plato maintain that
the ontological correlate o f this complex formula is itself not complex, but singular or unified. The
complexity o f the linguistic formula, in combination with A ristotle's'solution'of the problem through
appeal to genus and specific differentia, form and matter, and actuality and potentiality, have, I believe,
caused us to try to force Plato into a Procrustean bed. Though the Platonic divisions have a form resembling
that o f a genus-species hierarchy, there is no hint in the dialogues that the genus is somehow ontologically
prior to the species, o r vice-versa. With respect to their essences, each Form is equally freestanding and
independent Coupled with this lack o f ontological discrimination, however, is a methodological or heuristic
priority accorded the genus in Plato's method o f d ivision^. But this amounts to the claim that the divisions
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themselves, i.e., the results o f Platonic diaresis, should not be accorded existential force: they do pot
portray or represent the relational arrangements of the ideas, such that one idea is ontologically prior or
posterior to another, or that one is a whole o f which the others are parts. To view the diareseis in tins
fashion is to mistake the method utilized by the later Plato to aid with the discovery o f the unified ànd
unitary Form for an analysis o f the metaphysical nature of that Fonn. If we focus on the unitary nature o f
the Forms and the fact that diaresis provides us only with an analytical program, not an existential map, we
have little reason to think that the Forms either Have or Are the elements o f their definitions^. So, my
conclusion is that diere is no partaking between and hence no problem with the relation o f a Form to the
elements o f its definition. That said, it does not follow that the relation between Forms and the relation
between particulars and Forms are different. Sometimes Forms do partake o f other Forms, and when they
do, they are characterized by the property constituted by the Form o f which they partake. What does follo w
is that we need to view on a different plane the relation between Forms that is investigated through the
method o f diaresis. The relations are roughly those o f compatibility, incompatibility and implication. These,
are elements within logical or epistemological categories, not ontological features o f the world ofFopns.
The mention o f compatibility and implication brings me to the second question about properties or
notions which, although apparently subject to some kind o f one-over-many argument, do not seem to have
Forms correlated with them. It is widely agreed now that there is no solid evidence that Plato accepted what
might be called a semantic one-over many principle such that there is a Form corresponding to every
predicate in the language. There are a variety of ways to discount the Republic's apparent argument to this
effect, and there is die explicit testimony o f the Statesman that not all cuts get you kinds. But this said, there
remain a host o f notions, such as participation, which seem to be sufficiently well entrenched in Plato's
theories and /or remarks about what there is, that some have tried to use these notions either to craft
objections to Plato's theory or to salvage certain elements o f them. We have seen how Ryle employs a oneover many argument to create a regress o f participations. Other problematic notions for Plato include that of
Form itself. Clearly there are many Forms and hence shouldn't there be a Form, Formhood iteelf, in virtue
o f which each o f the Forms is a Form? Similarly, there will or should be the Particular Itself, the Soul itself,
and so on for every kind o f thing or category one finds in Plato's final metaphysics. O f the properties used ;
to buttress a Platonic argum ent the most often mentioned are being extended, persistence, being spatiotemporal, and being able to possess properties. These are pressed into service to ground the independence
o f particulars and thereby provide for particulars that are something, though what they are does not require
their sharing in F o r m s t With such properties in hand, scholars have gone on to build reconstructions of
Platonic particulars which allow them to partake o f Forms without being either bare particulars or merely
relational entities. Naturally, these same properties for which there are no Forms are useful in constructing
"Platonic solutions' to the problems o f change, persistence and essential predication. For instance, the
receptacle is said by Plato to have no properties for which there are Forms, so that it not interfere with the
incoming images. Yet it is said to have a nature (phusis) (e.g.,Twi. 49a4-5,50b5ff., especially 51a4-b4),
namely fie property o f receiving o r mirroring properties. Since there is no Form o f this property, it follows,
according to this line o f reasoning, that at least one thing that is not a Form (or form-copy) can have a nature
without having it in virtue o f partaking o f a Form.
There is talk o f the receptacle having a nature, as well as being invisible-and without shape or form .
Yet, it is unclear to me that this particular use o f φ ΰ σ ίς permits one to claim that it is essentially all
receiving, or is constituted by this property for which there is no Form. The relation between the Receptacle
and this property, beingall receiving, does not seem to be that o f Partaking o r Being, i.e., the ways o f
being appropriate to particulars and Forms respectively. Nowhere does Plato talk o f fie ousia o f the
receptacle, nor does he ever speak o f it as partaking except "somehow o f the intelligible in a most strange
way’ (5 lb l).3 0 Finally, attempts to define the receptacle at all or to assert that it is essentially or is
constituted bv any property or quasi-property strike me as inconcirmitous with the te x t N ot Only does
Timaeus insist that the receptacle is somehow a participant in a most perplexing way o f the intelligible, that
it is hard to grasp and grasped by some kind o f bastard reasoning, but Plato's usually lucid prose becomes
almost tortured in his depictions o f the receptacle. I think that his prose deliberately reflects the status o f the
receptacle. It is a posit o f reason, something required in and by his best theoretical account o f the
phenomena to be saved. It is not something that is to be defined within that account There are very difficult
questions here about how we shouldregardthe categories utilized in his theorizing and his attitude towards
them, questions about the nature o r fur^tion or status o f what yrem ight call transcendental notions, o r what
we might consider a problem appropriately handledhy meta-theory o r ín the meta-language. W hatever we
make o f the status Offie very categories.used in Our theory or Our account o f his theory, it seènis tO me to
be inappropriate to offer a second-order or transcendent^ notion ästh e essence or nature o f a first-order
entity, such as tiré receptacle. Be this as it may, the fact that Plato is so reticent to express him self about the
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nature o r essence o f the receptacle suggests not that he thinks it has some essence o r nature o f the sort
envisaged by these scholars, but rather that it has a different status, a status which renders talk o f whether
this or that is its essence inappropriate.
There are other properties or propeity-like entities to which appealhas been made to account for
Platonic particulars, especially notions like being extended, being spatio-temporal and persisting. These, I
think, fail to live up to their billings, which I shall attempt to show momentarily. But, along with 'being a
particular' or 'being a universal', I think they ,too, are categories o f the theory, notions which logically
prefigure any account o f what there is o f the sort that Plato has undertaken. They may be part o f the proper
study o f M etaphysics. But, it seems clear that Plato does not assert (or want to assert) that his primitive
kinds o f onta, as that notion figures in his accounts, are themselves to be explained o r constituted by
second-order properties o r categorical notions such as the property o f being a Form, or being a particular,
o r being capable o f receiving properties.
PART ΠΙ: PARTICULARS
Finally, we come to particulars and predication. As I've indicated, the use o f Non-Form properties
has been key to some accounts o f particulars in Plato, whether to explain the phusis o f the receptacle or to
allow us to sneak about independent particulars which can stand in relations to Forms. For the purposes of
this talk, I will assume that a bare particular is one that lacks any essential properties, not one that lacks any
properties at all^l. The debate I am interested in concerns whether o r not Plato allows that particulars are a)
relational entities, and b) whether this entails that they (can) have no essential properties. It has been argued
that Plato does allow for particulars with relational essential properties. Fine has put the case best^2.
According to her, Matthews and Cohen (M/C) 33 are wrong to thinkthat if some particular, x, is essentially
F, then it is F not in virtue o f its relation to F. A particular for Fine’s Plato turns out to be a 'roughly
independently identifiable spatio-temporal continuant’ (p.248) which has (an) essential property by standing
in a relation to some Form. Against M/C, Fine argues that there is nothing incoherent in the notion o f a
relational essential property. She cites in defense o f relational essential properties Kripke’s argument that I
am essentially related to my parents. Other properties, e.g., being minted at the appropriate facility, say the
Philadelphia mint, come to mind for the dime in my pocket^4. As for her claim that there are relational
essential properties, I concede Fine's point. But I am not convinced that she has squarely answered the
argument o f M/C. For M/C, the critical principle is:
P) For x to be able to bear any relation R to something else y, x must be something in its
own right, independently of its bearing R to y. (p.633)
My worry is whether Fine has confused being something essential relatiönally with being something in its
own right Fine has to show not that relational essential properties make sense, but rather that something, x,
can be essentially something relatiönally without being something in its own right prior to or independently
o f its being essentially related to y. Consider the dime in my pocket It is, 1 grant, essentially what it is, a
dime, in virtue o f a relational property, since in order to be a dime it must have been minted in Philadelphia.
Yet, although it was not a dime prior to being minted, there was the metal or matter that acquired the
property o f being a dime when it was minted. Moreover, we can independently identify the metal in its own
right. That is, while the dime came into being only when it acquired its relational essential property, the
metal did n o t Indeed, here we have a 'roughly identifiable spatiotemporal continuant' that becomes
essentially something. The samé is, I think, true of me; I am essentially related to my parents, although the
m atter-the pun is very much intended-, is more difficult to decide. In general, it seems to me that the
question is whether we have in Plato a doctrine o f particulars such that something which exists prior to any
relation it might stand in becomes essentially F by being related to The F Itself, or whether we have the
view that there is no particular prior to its relation tö F o rm s^. I tiö not deny the possibility that Socrates
becorues a man by becoming essentially related to, i.e. participating in, the Form Mari! I am urging,
however, that such a possibility is itself founded on there being something that comes to be Socrates upon
engaging in this relation, aqd that that thing, whatever it is, might not have become Socrates, and it might
cease to be Socrates. The availability of matter in post-Cartesian philosophy affords us the vehicle for
identifying what it is that becomes a dime, or becomes me. The unavailability o f m atter or at least an
appropriate analogue,would therefore preclude this option in a pre-Cartesian philosophy.I believe that; ?
there is no matter at ail in Plato that could serve in this way as the something which becomes Socrates. And
because I think there is no m atter that can become, say, a particular man by dint o f its 'essential relation' to
Man, I will argue that Socrates is not essentially related to Man, though he is related to Man. I will contend,
therefore, that Platonic particulars are bare particulars; They have all their properties via participation, they
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have no essential properties in any way, and they aie nothing besides or before partaking in some
Foim(s)36.
There are at least three ways to ground particulars as capable o f being something prior to their
participation in Forms. The first alternative looks to die Phaedo 's distinction between what Simmias is in
his own right and what he is in virtue o f his relation to Largeness (102b8-c4). I do not wish to debate this
controversial passage, since the Greek does not decide how we are to understand the notion 'w hat he is in
hisOwn right*. Suffice it to say that if Plato at one time thought that particulars should be treated as
essentially something in their own right apart from participating in some property, he appears to have
rethought this view by the time o f the Timaeus. This dialogue provides the evidence for the other
aforementioned ways. Here scholars have found m atter or something which can serve as the particular
independent o f and prior to its partaking in Forms; for instance, something which partakes o f properties,
such as being extended, for which there are no Forms. Having already discussed why I find the theoretical
presuppositions behind such views questionable, let me now address the textual evidence furnished by the
Timaeus. W hat evidence is there that particulars o f any kind exist prior to their participation in Forms? Since
we are looking for particulars» I ignore the receptacle^7. My question concerns the textual support for the
view that either discrete particulars o f some kind, e.g;, fire atoms or water atoms, or m atter are available in
the Timaeus to stand in as a relatum in the participation relatioa
Two passages have been adduced in support o f the notion that some particular-like entities predate
the intrusion o f Forms into the receptacle. The first is the so-called much-misread passage (49c7-50e4). The
second is the description o f the precosmos at 52d2-53b5. In the former, some o f those who would find
matter or primitive particulars o f some kind argue that the moral o f the much-misread passage is that there
are samples o f the traditional elements. However, because they are 'im pure’, i.e., mixed with the other
elements, when we point at such á sample and call it 'fire* we should not be mislead into thinking that we
have identified what fire is. Rather, since all sensible fire samples are impure, we m ust say not 'th at is fire’
but 'th at sort o f thing is fire’, so as to avoid the implication that there are pure samples o f Fire in the
sensible world^S. Another tack is taken by those who would argue that there is some kind o f primitive
matter, or some principle, that is permanent and stable and, because it is a constituent o f the sensible or
phenomenal bits o f fire o r water, confers upon them sufficient stability and permanence that our words can
hook on or refer to the phenom ena^. Finally, there is the line o f inteipretation that saves the phenomena
by arguing that Plato here wants us to reconstrue or to change the construal o f our statements, fiom
identifying statements to attributive statements, all the while maintaining that the nature o f the phenomena
does not change when we do so^O. The assumption common to all three positions is that sensible fire and
the other sensible elements are not reducible to or eliminable in favor o f the receptacle. They all want to
deny that 'sensible fire does not really exist’, a view they associate with Chemiss. The second passage
(52d2-53c3) is far too controversial to address adequately in this section o f the paper. Suffice it to say that
the traces, ίχνη (53b2), present in the primordial o r precosmic chaos are thought to support the claim that
there is something that can serve as the relatum on the left side o f the participation relation, or which can
possess extension or some other property for which there are no Forms. These traces, by participating in
Fonns, become sensible particulars o f ti¿ traditional so rt
As for the notion that there is matter in the Timaeus, perhaps it is sufficient to note that the term
ΰ λ η occurs only once (69a6) and carries the non-technical sense o f wood o r woody stuff, not the technical
sense introduced by Aristotle. O f course, this is not what the believers stake their claim on. They would
insist rather that unless we introduce matter, or ultimate material simples, or some kind o f material principle,
we can not make sense o f the two passages discussed above. Instead o f 'matter*, υ λ η , the term that carries
the sense o f 'm atter1is σ ώ μ α , or 'body'. The connection between body, m atter, and extension is surely
close, and to this extent the idea o f grounding thé independence o f particulars o r sensibles in the primitive
status o f extended bodies is not unattractive. Sensibles are then viewed as bodies occupying (a place in)
space, and the receptacle is accordingly viewed as introduced into the discussion in order to provide a place
or space for the primitive, ineliminable ivv/n^ia o f the traditional elements. It is the swmata that stand in the
participation relation to the Forms or to qúasi^propérties, and they are located in the receptacle. To the
objection that this is just to ig n o reafio f P lattfstalk o f μιμήματα or form-copies o f Forms entering and
exiting the receptacle, perhaps the reply would be that this is ju st metaphor, whose cash value is just that
thesé bodies have or acquire properties)'and that Foims are responsible for the properties in some hard to
explainuway.
";''v
.u'-'v
To the extent that proponents o f the view that sensibles are irreducible or ineliminable take issue
with Chemiss’ interpretation4 * o f the much-misread passage and the Timaeus in general, I cannot
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, specifically address diere counter-arguments. The thrust o f the criticism is encapsulated in the claim that
R e m iss introduces a fourth primitive into the Timaeus. It seems to me a curiosity that one would fault a
position for trying to eliminate something or reduce something to something else by claiming that the
position adds an additional primitive. It suggests that some aspect o f the argument was unclear or perhaps
missed by the critics. Such is the case, I believe. Since I am not interested so much in die details o f
Chemiss' papers, or those o f his critics, let me call the view I will defend the reconstructionalist position.
The key claim o f this position is that body, swma, is not a primitive in Plato's ontology; or equivalently,
that m atter is not a primitive notion for Plato. Along with this claim, the reconstructionalist also takes issue
With the notion that the receptacle is introduced as a third primitive merely added to Forms and sensibles in
order to provide for place or space. We maintain rather that the receptacle is introduced as the first element
in a new non-reductive analysis o f the phenomena. In support of this reading o f the role o f the receptacle,
Consider the criticism o f the previous cosmologists (48b3-c2). They had gone wrong in thinking that the
four traditional elements were either atoms or molecules, letters or syllables. According to the
reconstructionalist, to allow the phenomena to be (or remain) uninfluenced in their internal make-up by the
receptacle is to allot them the same status as had the earlier cosmologists and as had Timaeus him self in his
. first account W hat then are the phenomena according to the reconstructionalist? They are compounds of the
* réceptacle and Form-copies. Here o f course is where the charge o f a new fourth primitive seems to have
bite: for are not the form-copies a new fourth primitive where only three are available? The answer of course
is yes: they are new to the account and are viewed by Timaeus as something like a primitive, but no, they do
not constitute a fourth primitive. Rather, they along with the receptacle replace the phenomena on the list of
primitives, so one still is left with only three.
If we reconstructionalists can defend ourselves against the charge o f ontological inflation in this
manner, are we not guilty of reducing or eliminating the sensibles? l am not sure what reduction or
elimination amounts to in the hands o f these critics; but I do not believe a reconstructionalist eliminates the
phenomena or the sensibles, and I certainly do not think we must or do reduce thém to something in any
objectionable sense. Perhaps the best way to approach this topic is to refocus attention on the status o f body
in the Timaeus. And perhaps the best way to do that is to consider what will strike many as the difference in
respect o f status between Timaeus' traditional elements and the elements o f the preVióus cosmologists,
those which enjoyed the status o f atom or molecule. What Timaeus does o f course is to geometrize the
elements. Fire is not a στοιχείο v or a συλλαβή because it is a construction o f many different
triangles. It is a pyramid, whose faces are 4 in number, each o f which itself is composed o f 6 halfequilateral elements. The geometrization o f the elements takes us to the heart o f the controversy. Those
who would have the receptacle be the basic particular concede that one m ust somehow divide the
homogeneous space o f the receptacle irttq places. Similarly, those who would have body be a primitive in
Plato must admit that the best account o f these bodies views them not as the bodies o f the elements as such,
but as the shaped m atter posited in the geometrical account However, the geometrical bodies of shapes, the
allegedly basic elements o f the traditional elements, are themselves not unanalvzable. Timaeus; when he
begins his geometrical account, states clearly that "it is obvious to anyone that fire, earth, air, and water, are
bodies; and all body has depth. Depth, moreover, must be bounded by surface." (53c4-7) The critical
elements in this account are depth (β ά θ ο ς ) and being bounded by surface, not body as such. It is the
function o f the Geometrical forms to account for the bounding o f surfaces to provide for depth and thereby
make available to the natural philosopher the elementary bodies which he can use to construct the traditional
~elements. That these are the ftmdamental notions is further indicated by Timaeus' concession that perhaps
the two kinds o f triangles he will use are not necessary, that is, that perhaps one can build the bodies o f the
four elements and, hence, everything else from other geometrical fig u res^ .
If all body m ust have depth and depth must be bounded by surface, what is bounded? The answer
is the receptacle in its role as space or χ ώ ρ α . The bounding o f space creates both place, TÓÍTOS, and
geometrically shaped figures with depth, The different geometrical Forms provide what heretofore in the
Timaeus was merely assumed, namely the vehicle to bound space. So the analysis o f body into Receptacle
and geometrical Forms is a new feature o f the account begun at 48e2. That these geometrical Forms provide
for the bounding o f space also explains how the homogeneous receptacle comes to have or be places, for
the bounded areas will be discrete and distinct from one another. But these geometrical Forms only tell half
the story o f the nature o f sensible particulars. For while they provide for the quantitative dimensions o f the
párticuíars,--and I m ight add thereby show that there is no need to appeal to a Form-less property like being
¿^tended--, they do not account for the qualitative features o f the sensible particulars. These features, e.g.,
being fiefv. Orbeing watery, are instead assigned by Timaeus to ih e traditional Forms, Fire itself. W ater
itself, etc^k. Instances o f these Forms, as well as instances o f the geometrical· Forms,fentgr and exit the
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receptacle. In thé M l analysis o f a sensible particular appeal will be made therefore to both kinds o f Forms,
the geometrical and the traditional. The two accounts; which I will call the Formal and the Geometrical, turn
out to be complementary. The geometrical Forms provide for the {daces where the various form-copies o f
the traditional Forms enter and exit the receptacle. The form-copies o f the traditional Forms, on the other
hand, provide for the qualitative or phenomenal features o f the particular instances o f fire, water, air and
earth. Thus the foil analysis o f a phenomenal instance o f fire, or a sensible fire (instance), will mention both
types o f Forms, or better, form-copies o f both tÿpès o f Forms, and the receptacle.
Does this account o f sensible particulars eliminate them from the ontology or reduce them to the
receptacle or anything(s) else? No. It does not eliminate them; Plato feels no compunction about talking in
terms o f sensibles and particulars. Nor do I think we reconstructionalists have reduced sensible particulars
to anything else. I have certainly offered an analysis o f sensible particulars in terms o f form-copies and the
receptacle. However, I have not argued that a particular is reducible to the receptacle and the Forms. I do
not believe that Plato tried, or that one can, reduce particulars to Universale or properties, even bundles o f
them. Plato does not try to reduce or account for the particularity o f the particulars. On the contrary, he
accepts particularity as à primitive notion. But instead o f granting primacy or primitiveness to particular bits
o f m atter or particulars äs they are traditionally conceived, he.·, spatio-temporal continuants or the primary
substances o f the Categories , he accords it to the form-copy or property-instance o f Forms. They provide
for the partitioning o f foe receptacle and the particularity o f the sensible particulars. O f course, foevarieties
o f reduction so often discussed in modem articles and books is not to be found in Plato. The only potential
reduction, it seems fo m e, is a reduction o f foe traditional Forms, e.g.. Fire itself or M an itself, to
geometrical F orm s'^. As for foe sensible particulars themselves, what they are is a nothing less than, but
also nothing m ote than, a collection o f form-copies o f the traditional forms, including form-copies o f Man
and other 'highly complex' Forms, in a field defined by the form-copies o f foe geometrical Forms.
Naturally, the more complex the particular, the more complex will be both foe form-copies present to the
field and foe number and combination o f triangles composing that particular. The persistence o f particulars
will then be explained both through appeal to foe persistence o f certain geometrical shapes and foe
coincidental conjunction o f the appropriate form-copies for foe 'sam e length o f time'. One can, I believe,
sophisticate the account so that it is not merely coincidental that the form-copy, say, o f Bipedality
accompanies foe form-copy o f Man, by developing an account o f necessary Having based on foe
implication relations obtaining between Forms.
The intuitive problem with this story is that it makes it seem all too convenient that foe right formcopies should be matched up with the right geometrical shapes so that the phenomenal properties and the
material aspects or properties of man are co-instantiated in the same place or contiguous places for the same
length o f time. One cannot dispel entirely the air o f ad-hocness here. But nor should one have to. The fact
that the appropriate shapes have the appropriate causal properties is not simply a function o f geometry.
Considered from foe demiurgic point o f view, the shapes are chosen and put together in the appropriate way
because the demiurge knows foe Form, Fire itself, and thus knows what characteristics the triangular
elements must produce in foe sensible fire molecules.
The account presented in foe Timaeas, if I am right, yields particulars that are nothing but bundles
o f Form-copies. Because they are bundles o f Form-copies or property-instances, some traditional
objections to bundle particulars are obviated. Because they are property-instances, more than one form-copy
can occupy foe same place at the same time. Because no two instances are identical, nothing could share all
foe properties o f anything else-they cannot even share one-alfootigh two particulars could be indiscernible
in that they each have foe same properties, i.e., because they each have property-instances o f foe same
traditional Forms. Any given particular would be a collection o f form-copies o f the traditional Forms
residing in o r located in a particular region o f the reoptacle.A region would be demarcated by the formcopies o f foe appropriate geometrical Forms, which constitute foe (outer edges o f the) body o f the
particular. Participation by foe particular in a Form thus amounts to foe addition o f a form-copy to foe
collection o f form-copies that comprise foe particular. Strictly speaking, the addition o r loss o f a form-copy
amounts to the coming-into being o f a new particular and the destraction o f foe old one. Plato might
justifiably consider this state to be one o f flux. B u tld o not believe that Plato regards all foe properties o f a
particular as on a par. By foe later dialogues, if not before, he realized that Forms come in families and that
some Forms im plicate others. Hence some particulars will lose and gain some properties in groups.
Moreover, once he has satisfactorily constructed the bodies o f particulars from geometrical shapes, foe
persistence o f certain configurations will allow him to fix certain properties as stable and persisting and
others as more transient Finally, if he can work out an account of how soul infuses, or invades these
regions o f foe receptacle where there are bodies of foe requisite soit, he can gain added stability for some
particulars.
v®;··. .
.
C ‘\'
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Yet, no particular configuration o f triangles nor any collection o f properties will remain totally
frozen. The impermanence o f these constituents o f the particular are one reason behind Plato's denial o f
essential properties to th e m ^ . This picture will not delight those enamored o f Aristotle's hylomorphic
compounds. But Plato is not attracted to his student's views on the matter. The implication relation holding
between Forms allows him to claim that there are what we might call conditional necessities true o f
particulars; for example, the claim that as long as Socrates is a man he is rational, o r necessarily rational, or
that as long as this water is snow it is cold. But it is not metaphysically necessary that Socrates be a man, or
that this water be snow. The flux o f particulars is grounded in this absence o f necessity, this transience of
properties, and finally in the characterlessness o f the receptacle, which is die foundation for all the material
aspects o f a particular, Looked at from the other direction, fire flux o f particulars is due to their dependence,
on Forms for all fiieir properties. Here flux ju st is the lack o f independence that distinguishes Platonic
particulars from Aristotelian particulars. In oné sense o f Necessity, Plato thinks that particulars are totally
contingent creatures. It is not necessary that die demiurge construct the world, or that Form-copies
congregate in the appropriate fashion. However, this is to take too dim a view o f the creation myth. Given
the nature o f the Demiurge, o r if, like me, you view the creation as mythical, given the nature o f the
receptadle and the Forms, particidars are die inevitable result of the natures o f these two primitive elements
o f the Ontology. Forms beget from-copies and the form-copies in conjunction with the receptacle produce
particulars. Essence remains locked in the Forms and in their immediate offspring, inaccessible to, though
strived after, by sensible particulars.
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6See, for instance. Fine’s thorough discussion of the varieties of separation, SEP, 31-45. Compare D.M. Armstrong,
Nominalism and Realism, (Cambridge, 1978) pp. 64-76.
7See Fine, SEP, pp.45ff. for this account and further references.
8On this line of reasoning, the dispute between Plato and his most famous student boils down to whether being a
substance, an ousia, enteis that that entity is a particular. Aristotle says yes, Plato says no.
9On this line of reasoning, the dispute between Plato and his most famous student boils down to whether being a
substance, an ousia, entails that that entity is a particular. Aristotle says yes, Plato says no.
10Cf. Code, p.46.
n Cf. Fine, SEP, p.35.
12Code would reply, I think, that the linguistic predicability of the definition is sufficient to show that the essence is
ontologically I-predicable of the item defined, but it does not follow from the fact that some particular Has
(ontologically) an essence that the linguistic definition is predicable of the (name of the) particular. The definition is
viewed as only I-predicable. Hence the definitional separation of Forms is preserved because the 1-definition is
predicable only of the Form. Note that the problem generated by the identity of Form and essence is not restricted to
Forms of natural kinds: Whiteness is identical with its essence. Since Socrates Has whiteness, he should also Have
the essence of Whiteness and hence the definition of Whiteness should be 1-predicable of Socrates. But it is not,
which gives Code reason to argue that H-predicability is independent from definitional separation. While this is a
plausible account of Aristotle's position, it is difficult to see why Plato would be moved to adopt it. Lacking the
notion of 'paronomy' and the attendant machinery of the Categories, it would mean that Plato is moved to separate
Forms because a linguistic predicate can not be properly attached to a subject-term, even though the property
introduced by the predicate does belong to the referent of the subject-term. Since I believe that the linguistic
predicability of a predicate is explained by the metaphysical facts, I discount the option offered by Code. See F.
Lewis, 'Plato's Third Man Argument and the "Platonism" of Aristotle,' in J. Bogen and J.E. McGuire, How Things
Are, (Dordecht, 1983), pp.000.
13The causal efficacy of the property seems to require that whatever aspect of the property is immanent should be
responsible for causing the appropriate effects in the physical world.
14If Time permitted, I would here introduce the second hypothesis of the Parmenides into the discussion. What we
make of the claim that while Unity and Being are never found apart nonetheless we can grasp each by itself in
thought, (143a6-9) is liable to have profound consequences for any account of separation of Forms from one another,
and for my account of the possibility of (I-)predicating essences of both Forms and form-copies.
15GRyle, 'Plato's Parmenides'.originally printed in Mind, 1939, reprinted in Collected Papers Vol. I, (London,
1971) plO (pagination from reprint). Ryle then adds that this is not Bradley's regress 'found in the necessity of there
always existing a further relation to relate any relation to its terms.’ See also Armstrong, I, pp. 70-71. See Gail
Fine,'Armstrong On Relational and Nonrelational Realism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62 (1981), pp.262-71,
for a lucid discussion of problems with Armstrong's account of relational realisms.
16So Cook-Wilson argued in Statement and Inference 2.vols., (Oxford, 1926) p.398.
17See, for instance, Armstrong, p.70-71: 'I t appears, then, that the Relation regress holds against all relational
analyses of what it is for an object to have a property or relation.’ (underlined phrase is my emphasis)
18For instance, in both cases English speakers use the expression 'is', although the two cases represent different
kinds of predication or different relations.
19I blush to confess that I am relying on my notes here for my portrayal of Frede's account in Praedikation und
Existenzaussage. My university library has been so far unable to find its copy or acquire one through inter-library
loan.
20 G. Vlastos, 'The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides,' Philosophical Review 63 (1954), pp.319-49.
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21Another option is to allow all forms to self-predicate. Another traditional interpretation of this passage is that what
is being marked off is two kinds of predicates, namely complete predicates and incomplete ones. Complete predicates
are those that can be the predicate in a statement of the form 'a is b ' and yield a sense such that the statement can be
understood as is. Incomplete are those predicates which yield statements that cannot be so understood, because they
must be added on to in some sense.This approach is neutral with respect to the predication relation utilized in these
statements. On the other hand, it is silent about the notion of predicate being used here and the eligible substituenda
for the name-variable 'a'. Can the predicates 'large* or 'equal* or 'good', three admittedly incomplete predicates, be
subjects in sentences of the form 'Good Itself is...* ? Since there are Forms correlated with these predicates they can
occur as subjects. But if they can occur as subjects, then what are we to say about sentences where the predicate
appears on both sides of the 'is*? Is it used there incompletely or not? Here too then we might find appeal made to
different senses of the copula, depending upon how these different kinds of predicates are being used, assuming that
they are different kinds of predicates.
22For Plato, if some property-like entity turns out not to be definable, then it lacks an essence-and, hence, cannot be
said to be aka--, and it fails to exist in any way that he would have us understand the Greek expressions equivalent to
this use of 'exist'. Such is Plato's problematic of 'being', not our problematic of 'existence'.
^H ere, again, the pattern of inferences in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides needs to be considered: starting
from a one-being, Parmenides/Plato 'generates' Difference through consideration of our conceptual abilities to at once
isolate and consider in tandem Unity and Being.
^Alexander Nehamas, 'Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought,' Review o f Metaphysics 36 (1982),
343-74.
^T his would be consonant with Nehamas' reading. It is suggested by the argument at 256dl l-257a6.
26Recall that Ising or Ι-predication links an essence to a subject Note also that nothing precludes a subject from
necessarily Having or being characterized by some property. Necessity is neutral with respect to the predication
relations.
27 The completed reconstruction of a hierarchy will begin from the genus and descend to the ínfima species.
^Scholars are split over this issue.Code, pp.426-9, allows that a Form Has the elements of its definiendum.
Meinwald, Plato's Parmenides, (Oxford, 1989) (following Frede?), I think, would claim that the elements of the
definition are essentially or I-predicated (my phrasing) of the definiendum. Moravscik's intensional mereology also
should be read as having ontological force, 'Plato's Method of Division,' in Patterns in Plato's Thought, (Dordecht,
1973) p.166.
29See, for instance, M. McPherran, 'Plato's Particulars,’ Southern Journal o f Philosophy 26 (1988),527-553;Perhaps
also G. Fine, 'Relational Entities,’Archivefur Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983), pp.225-249. (Hereafter RE)
See infra pages 000.
30Being constituted' has the advantage of not having a counterpart in Plato's Greek, but it is problematic
nonetheless. First, it is not just all receiving, but shapeless and invisible, so it would seem to be equally constituted
by these properties. Second, it does receive the whole gamut of form-copies and throughout itself, so there are
reasons to think it is related to these properties (too) via constitution. Cf. McPherran, art.cit.
3^Following Fine, RE p.229, especially note 8.
32RE
33G.B. Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, 'The One and The Many,’Review o f Metaphysics 21 (1968)pp. 631-55.
34Fine also appeals to the relation 'being a copy o f with reference to a picture of Reagan. Since this example
introduces many additional concerns, e.g., the image analogy in Plato, the nature of representations, I cannot go into
the details of this example.
33I concede that some philosophers have thought that an object can come into being simultaneously with or in
virtue of some relation. I have difficulty understanding how this can be. Cf. The objection of John Boler discussed
in RE, p.236 note 23.
36I omit from the discussion the nature and role of souls.
37In order to generate particulars we would somehow have to 'divide' the receptacle. See below pages....
38Fine, RE, p.239.
39M.L. Gill, 'M atter and Flux in Plato's Timaeus,' Phronesis 32 (1981), pp.34-53.
40D. Zeyl, 'Plato and Talk of a World in Flux,' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 79 (1975), pp. 125-48.
41H. Chemiss, Ά Much Misread Passage of the Timaèus,’ American Journal o f Philology 88 (1954), pp. 113-30.
See my 'Timaean Particulars', Classical Quarterly, forthcoming, May 1992
4253d4-54a6. See also the initial account of the construction at 31-2.
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43Forms included among the 'e t cetera' are Forms of all the traditional elements. Forms of all the kinds of things
'constructed' from these elements, e.g., metals and liquids, and Forms of more complex entities such as Man and
Horse,
^Such a Pythagorized Plato would be congenial to many. Robert Turnbull hais advocated this approach in my
presence continuously over die years.
45Cf. M. Frede, 'Being and Becoming in Plato,' Ο φ τά Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume,
1988, pp.36-52; R. Patterson./mage and Reality in Plato'sMetaphysics, (Indianapolis, 1985); and T. Penner, The
Ascent From Nominalism, (Dordecht, 1987),

